Even though the momentum of the "devolution" movement has slowed, federal intergovernmental grants will probably be cut substantially during the next five to ten years. Federal tax reform could further erode federal assistance by eliminating the deduction for state and local personal income and property taxes. This deduction subsidizes the net cost to taxpayers of financing an additional dollar of state and local spending. In the language of economics, deductibility reduces the marginal "tax price" of state and local public goods. This paper clarifies methodological issues in the estimation of this tax price, updates estimates of tax price by state, and evaluates the impact of state and local taxes on the level and dispersion of state-specific tax prices. The paper argues that previous estimates of tax reflect assumptions, often implicit, concerning the distribution of influence among consumers over the level of public goods provided by a given jurisdiction. These assumptions, often implicit, do not always square with the estimators' preferred theory concerning how the level of public goods is determined. Even when they do, they fail to take into account the deductibility of state and local business taxes from federal taxable profits. The estimates provided in this paper attempt to address these two problems.
1

THE SUBSIDY FROM STATE AND LOCAL TAX DEDUCTIBILITY: TRENDS, METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES, AND ITS VALUE AFTER FEDERAL TAX REFORM
Even though the momentum of the "devolution" movement has slowed, federal intergovernmental grants will probably be cut substantially during the next five to ten years. Federal tax reform could further erode federal assistance by eliminating the deduction for state and local personal income and property taxes. This deduction subsidizes the net cost to taxpayers of financing an additional dollar of state and local spending. In the language of economics, deductibility reduces the marginal "tax price" of state and local public goods (hereafter simply referred to as "tax price").
This paper clarifies methodological issues in the estimation of tax price, updates estimates of tax price by state, and evaluates the impact of eliminating deductibility of state and local taxes on the level and dispersion of state-specific tax prices.
I. Methodological Issues in the Measurement of Tax Price
In evaluating the impact of subsidization in private markets, one estimates the subsidy's initial effect on price and subsequent adjustments in supply and demand.
The task is more complicated in the case of a publicly provided good because its price varies by consumer, and each consumer's bidding power reflects his or her political influence. For each consumer, therefore, one must determine the price faced and the consumer's ability to "bid" for goods in the public decision-making arena.
This task becomes much simpler if one can identify a "decisive decision-maker," whose response determines a jurisdiction's level of public spending. Knowledge of the Inman (1986) reviews and critiques the median voter model, as well as several other 1 applicable public decision-making models. Further theoretical discussion of the median voter model can be found in Borcherding and Deacon (1962) and Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) .
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"tax price" faced by the decision-maker and his or her price elasticity is sufficient to determine the impact of deductibility on the spending level. An example of such a decision-maker is the "median voter" hypothesized in some decision-making models.
In these models, the distribution of preferences for the level of public spending is single-peaked. Under the assumption of majority rule, the preference of the voter at the 50th percentile in this distribution always prevails. A major obstacle to testing these 1 models is identifying the median voter. Zimmerman (1983) defines the median voter as the person with the median pre-tax income. Gramlich (1985) infers the characteristics of the median voter from a 1978 survey of Michigan voters that included questions concerning income, itemizer status, and preferences concerning changes in the level of state and local spending.
Many scholars, dissatisfied with median voter models, have assumed that the "community as a whole" determines a jurisdiction's level of public spending. When attempting to determine deductibility's impact on the tax price faced by a "community,"
these scholars make assumptions, often implicit, about the distribution of political influence among members of the community or the mix of taxes used to finance marginal public spending. Sometimes these assumptions do not square with the author's preferred decision-making theory. Even when they do, they fail to take into account the deductibility of state and local business taxes from federal taxable profits.
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Consider, for example, the definition of average tax price used by Feldstein and Metcalf (1987) According to Kenyon's (1986) rises with its tax bill; the higher the household's share of the tax bill, the higher its stake in the spending-level decision. In rebuttal, one could argue that the most powerful households are able to keep their tax bills low, forcing others to foot the bill. However, I
would argue that weighting itemizers' federal marginal tax rates by the amount of state and local taxes paid provides a more accurate measure of tax price than weighting them equally or double-weighting joint filers.
With respect to the second drawback to Kenyon's measure, the deductibility of state and local business taxes has never been taken into account, for at least two reasons. First, models of state and local spending levels posit no role for businesses because firms do not vote. Yet, in determining the aggregate level of a state's state and local spending, businesses exert a powerful influence through lobbying, campaign contributions, and threats to move to other states. Perhaps businesses play little role at the local level, for example, in setting the size of a school district's budget (the median voter model was originally designed for local decision-making). At the state level, however, it is unrealistic to ignore their influence.
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Deductions for state and local taxes on business reduce the effective marginal burden of those taxes, just as comparable deductions do for state and local taxes on households. The reduction in marginal tax burden for businesses is potentially large,
given that all business taxes are deductible and all businesses are in effect "itemizers,"
that is, they all deduct their taxes.
II. Alternative Estimates of Tax Price Based on a New Methodology
The following formula, set forth in Tannenwald The formula in effect says that, for any state, the household component of the tax subsidy rate is a function of households' share of taxes, the proportion of household taxes that is deductible, the percentage of household deductible taxes that is actually 8 deducted, and the average federal tax savings per deducted tax dollar. The business component of the tax subsidy rate is equal to business's share of taxes times the average federal tax savings per deducted business tax dollar.
The formula implies that the influence of all taxpayers on the level of state and local spending, businesses as well as households, is proportional to the amount of tax they pay. This assumption is arbitrary. Ideally, the relative weights applied to the household and business components should be derived from an explicit model of the process by which the level of such spending is determined. The formula can be modified to incorporate whatever relative weights one feels are appropriate.
Results for the Nation as a Whole
Using this formula, I estimated the nationwide tax subsidy rate, as well as its household and business components, for 1977, 1980, 1985, 1988, and 1995 . Sources of data are described and further methodological details are explained in the Appendix.
Results are presented in Figure 1 and Table 1 .
As Figure 1 shows, the total tax subsidy rate is much higher--and, therefore, the tax price much lower--when the business component is taken into account. Indeed, the business component is greater than the household component in each of the five years examined except 1985. While the household component ranged from 10.0 percent to 6.7 percent, the total subsidy rate has ranged from 21.5 percent to 15.3 percent. Figure 1 ). This discrepancy is important in evaluating state-specific estimates of tax subsidy and tax price, which exclude high-income tax filers. In the interest of confidentiality, the state of residence of high-income filers is not revealed in publicly available tax file tapes. Since states' distributional characteristics differ considerably, the exclusion of high-income filers in state-specific estimates could be a serious source of bias.
State-by-State Estimates
State-by-state estimates of tax subsidy rates and their components are presented in Tables 2 and 3 . As is the case for the nation as a whole, the business component is larger than the household component in every state except Maryland and
Oregon. The economies of states with the highest business components tend to rely disproportionately on extractive industries and the severance and property taxes that these industries generate. Hence they also tend to rank among those states with the 13 highest total tax subsidy rates. It should be noted that state-specific estimates for business share are for 1990, the latest year for which such estimates are available (Tannenwald 1993a (Tannenwald , 1993b The rank of a state's household component is highly correlated with both the propensity of its households to itemize and its ratio of deducted-to-total household taxes. Thus Maryland's and Oregon's propensities to itemize rank 1 and 2, respectively, while their ratios of deducted-to-total household taxes rank 2 and 1, respectively. States with a high propensity to itemize tend to enjoy high average income, have expensive housing, and impose high income and/or property tax burdens.
The Issue of User Fees and Charges
Like all previous estimates of tax price and tax subsidy rates, the estimates provided in this paper fail to take into account user fees, charges, and other general purpose nontax revenues. These nontax sources accounted for 30 percent of all state and local general own-source revenues in 1992 and 1993. None of those payments made by households were deductible, while all of those payments made by businesses were deductible. Since the three largest sources of state and local user fees are schools, hospitals, and waste collection, probably at least 80 percent of them are not deductible. However, we really do not know the breakdown of fees and charges 14 between businesses and households; disaggregating them in this fashion would make a useful contribution to research on the impact of deductibility.
III. Impact of Eliminating Deductibility on Tax Subsidy Rate and Tax Price
Any base-broadening tax proposal that would eliminate the deductibility of state and local income and property taxes would reduce the nationwide tax subsidy rate by the size of the household component, or by 7.2 cents on the dollar. As a result, the subsidy rate would fall from 16.1 percent to 9.0 percent, the size of the business component. The nationwide average tax price of state and local public goods and services would increase from $.839 to $.911, a percentage increase of 8.5 percent.
The corresponding changes in state rates (again biased downward by the exclusion of high-income households) would range from 10.4 percent in Maryland to 0.9 percent in Wyoming (Table 4) .
If tax price were computed solely on the basis of the household component, the elimination of deductibility would raise the nationwide tax price from $.938 to $1.00, a percentage increase of 7.7 percent. Estimates of state-specific increases in tax price (once again biased by the absence of high-income taxpayers) would range from 9.6 percent in Maryland to 0.7 percent in Wyoming. Thus, in the aggregate, taking into account the deductibility of state and local business taxes raises the likely impact of the elimination of household tax deductibility, slightly but not by much.
Should the federal government eliminate its corporate profits tax, the implications for tax price would depend on how state and local taxes would be treated 15 under the new federal tax regime. The impacts could be far more serious than those resulting from the elimination of the deductibility of state and local personal income and household property taxes. Consider, for example, the replacement of the federal corporate profits tax with a gross-up and credit value-added tax in which governmental services were not "in the loop." Under such conditions, the entire tax subsidy, including its business component, would disappear. The average nationwide tax price of state and local public goods would increase from $.839 to $1.00, or approximately 19 percent. The impact on states that rely heavily on business taxes would be even larger.
IV. Summary and Suggestions for Further Research
The media have showered much attention on the substantial future cuts in direct federal intergovernmental assistance advocated as part of the Contract with America.
Less attention has been focused on the potential effect of federal tax reform on the subsidy enjoyed by state and local governments from the deductibility of a large portion of their taxes from federal taxable income. Both direct and indirect cuts in federal aid are being considered at a time when demand is growing for state and local services such as education, health care, and law enforcement. Especially in these circumstances, state and local policymakers need accurate estimates of the size of the tax subsidy they enjoy and how much federal tax reform would reduce it.
This paper shows that, when the deductibility of state and local business taxes from federal taxable corporate profits is taken into account, the subsidy is considerably See ACIR (1981) and Tannenwald (1993a Tannenwald ( , 1993b ) for a description of data and 4 methodology used in estimating business's share.
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larger than most analysts have previously believed. The estimate of the subsidy's magnitude becomes even larger when one weights itemizers' marginal federal tax rate by the amount of state and local taxes that he or she pays, rather than weighting each marginal tax rate equally or double-weighting jointly filed returns of married couples.
As a result, federal tax reforms that would completely eliminate the subsidy could raise the tax price of state and local public goods by close to 20 percent.
How much would such state and local spending decline in response to a price increase of such a magnitude? In order to answer this question, one needs an estimate of the price elasticity of the demand for state and local public goods. Previous estimates have clustered between 0.25 and .50 (Courant and Rubinfeld 1987) .
However, they are based on measures of tax price that are flawed in ways analyzed in this paper. We need to go back to square one, reestimate tax prices by state accurately, and then reestimate the price elasticity of demand for state and local goods.
Unfortunately, the data required to do so are not readily available. Estimates of "business's share" of state and local taxes have been crude to begin with, given lack of timely, comprehensive, and comparable estimates across states of business's share of sales taxes and property taxes. What few data had been available to estimate business's share of property taxes are no longer collected by the U.S. Census Bureau. 4 We need new data sources to improve our estimates of the business-household tax mix, if we are to accurately estimate tax prices.
APPENDIX
In Tables 1 to 4 , data used in estimates were obtained from the following sources:
State and local taxes deducted by households. 1977, 1980, 1985, 1988 1988 and 1995 --Tannenwald (1993a , 1993b Note: Totals may not equal the sums of components because of rounding. In the computation of the 1995 household component, tax deductions for taxes other than state and local personal income and real estate taxes were not available. These are mostly taxes on personal property and account for only a small fraction of all deducted taxes.
Source: See Figure 1 and the Appendix. 
